This report is concerning Frank George Prantil and his daughter Mary Theresa Prantil. In past reports authored by Miss Prantil, she has stated that " I'm proud to have been the daughter of Frank G. Prantil" and that she again "comes from a "PRESTIGIOUS" family based in the San Diego there in the state of California.
I can't speak for the character of the rest of her family as I don't personally know them however, I have no reason to believe them to be anything other then reasonable and law abiding people however, I can relay what I've read from credible sources such as transcripts from the Supreme Court, Colleges of Frank Prantil, Attorney Generals office, State Attorneys office legal sites etc pertaining to Frank G. Prantil.
Miss Prantil has stated that "My father got off lots of criminals" then latter went on to say: "My father got off lots of criminals and innocent people to", LOL. Well, I'm sure he did successfully defend some innocent people along the way but from the looks of it, he also was instrumental in successfully defending the trash of society such as Murders, Child Molesters, Check Forgers, Bank Robbers etc. Upon researching the records and past legal performance of Mr. Prantil, I was also informed that not only was he successful in defending the scum of humanity on several occasions but went on to be completely corrupted by the same criminals that he had been representing throughout his practice.
It was in my research sited below, did I run across several charges launched against Frank G. Prantil via the Supreme and Superior court system there in California, such infractions as Perjury, Drug Poisson, Drug Abuse, Unlawfully removing $700, 000 from a Clients safe as she sat in jail awaiting a murder trial and so fourth. Mr. Prantil also had interfered with the homicide trial by becoming personally involved with his Client of that same murder trial by attempting to cover for the accused so he could recover his fees. Prantil lied blatantly on several occasions and attempted to hold up the due process of law by filling one frivolous motion of delay right after another just like Mary in the current charges being lodged against her by the State of New York.
Frank Prantil was known as a greedy individual who would stop at nothing to accomplish his goals be they of a positive or unethical nature, JUST LIKE Mary T. Prantil his daughter, He was considered out spoken, brazened, and ruthless just like his daughter Mary T. Prantil Internet Terrorist Extraordinaire. So in essence and according to other legal professionals, Frank Prantil was nothing but a GREEDY UNETHICAL Attorney that happened to like the spotlight just like Mary. Another thing I'd like to add here. Did you know that Frank G. Prantil was in and out of rehab centers for his uncontrolled use of illegal narcotics? Did you know that he was imprisoned for 14 months for not only botching a homicide trial, but for being an Accomplice to check FORGERY in the commission of that crime.
As you can read in the research below, Mr. Prantil wasn't considered a professional on any level by the courts or his peers. Mr. Prantil was DISBARRED twice for drug, unethical activity, and leaving his Clients holding the bag simply because they ran out of money in the middle of their defense. Does any of this sound familiar? Does it sound like anything Miss Mary T. Prantil has done in the past? I would say that Little Mary is the preverbal apple that didn't fall very far from the tree, wouldn't you say? Well, Frank Prantil won't be bothering, SCAMMING, or ripping off his Clients any more because he's now deceased. Good Riddance I say.
Now, we have little Mary carrying on his legacy with all of her criminal activities such as you can view below after her fathers information. Please view the facts below coming from the Experts and those that had the misfortune of dealing with him first hand. Sounds like a real Gypsy Scum Ball to me. Read the history of this Idiot and be SHOCKED and then read about the exploits of his daughter little miss marry low life prantil, people like this should just be locked away forever and kept from wasting the courts time and resources.
High Court Closes Book on Colorful Legal Career
SAN DIEGO At Largehttp://articles.latimes.com/1989-03-31/local/me-603_1_high-court
March 31, 1989|ANTHONY PERRY
The California Supreme Court has quietly ended one of San Diego County's more clamorous legal careers.
The court this month upheld the disbarment of Frank George Prantil, a well-known attorney and aspiring politician before being convicted of perjury and forgery charges and spending 14 months in prison.
"At one time, he was considered one of the county's top defense attorneys, " said attorney Eugene Iredale, who once represented Prantil. "Somehow his life just fell apart on him."
Now living outside Sacramento, the 51-year-old Prantil said he was "devastated" by the court's rejection of his plea that he was unfairly convicted. And he repeated his oft-made accusation that he was victimized because of his maverick ways.
"I'm a victim of the war on drugs, " Prantil said. "The prosecutors and the courts can't stand it when someone insists that all defendants have rights."
In nearly two decades as a practicing attorney, the San Diego native was never far from the headlines. He won several high-publicity felony cases and big-money damage suits. He defended a San Diego councilman indicted in the Yellow Cab scandal.
Reporters loved his flamboyant rhetoric (he favored Shakespeare and the classics) and brash attire (he wore an American flag tie to court). His practice boomed. He moved from East County to a comfortable spread in La Jolla.
But there were also political defeats, angry public disputes, money problems and his final slide into Vacaville state prison. He concedes now that alcohol and marijuana played a role in his difficulties.
He lost races for Congress (1968), district attorney (1970) and El Cajon Municipal Court (1978). The County Bar Assn. branded him as unqualified. The State Bar in 1979 suspended him for six months for misusing a client's money.
He was convicted in 1983 of forgery and perjury in a case involving a bogus $53, 000 check and, in 1986, of being an accessory to a cocaine conspiracy. Released from prison in 1987, Prantil says he will never return to San Diego County: "They rode me out on a rail."
He says that Deputy Dist. Atty. Bob Sullivan had a vendetta against him. Sullivan says that's bunk and notes that two juries convicted Prantil on a number of counts.
From his self-imposed exile, Prantil tries not to dwell on how far he has fallen. "I used to believe in ultimate justice, " he said. "I don't anymore."
A Winning T-Shirt
T-shirts protesting the judge's decision will go on sale today in 14 San Diego County outlets of Pacific Eyes and T's, the Sorrento Valley-based T-shirt and sunglasses chain.
The new shirts show a Conner-like catamaran with a large screw through it, and a kiwi bird laughing at the sight. Price: $10.
Pacific Eyes and T's has long backed Conner against pirate-banker Michael Fay. During the September races it sold shirts saying "No Way Fay", and "Throw Another Kiwi on the Barbie."
A Well-Done Roast
In Pete Wilson's latter years as mayor of San Diego, it was said he had two goals: to learn to sing and to become governor.
He took lessons and can manfully handle a tune. The second goal eluded him, and he settled for the U.S. Senate. Now, he's trying to rectify that with his third try at the governorship, with his likely Democratic foe being Atty. Gen. John Van de Kamp.
Thursday night the Republican Wilson was among those roasting Assembly Speaker Willie Brown (D-San Francisco) at a benefit dinner in Oakland.
He joked that he wasn't surprised to find picketers carrying signs urging him to stay in the Senate. What did surprise him, he said, was that one of the signs was carried by Van de Kamp.
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http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/843/843.F2d.314.86-6669.html
http://cases.justia.com/us-court-of-appeals/search? q=Frank George Prantil&circuit=
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843 F.2d 314
Frank George PRANTIL, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 86-6669.
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Sept. 23, 1987*.
Memorandum Jan. 4, 1988.
Order and Opinion March 31, 1988.
Frank G. Prantil, Fair Oaks, Cal., pro se.
M. Howard Wayne, Deputy Atty. Gen., San Diego, Cal., for respondent-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California.
Before CHOY, FARRIS and HALL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
1
Frank George Prantil, a California state prisoner, appeals the district court's summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254.
I.
2
Prantil, formerly an attorney in California, was introduced to Daryl Bell by his client Melvin Goins. Prantil agreed to represent Bell on a criminal charge. A few weeks later a woman purporting to be Bell's mother asked Prantil to help her negotiate an escrow check from which Prantil would receive his fee. Prantil accompanied the woman to his bank where he informed the teller that the woman was his client's mother and that he wanted to deposit the check into his trust account. The woman signed the check, which was made payable to Joanna F. McKnight, and Prantil endorsed it to his trust account. Neither Prantil nor the woman indicated that the check might not be genuine.
3
Subsequently, the owner of an escrow agency discovered that three checks were missing from her office. One of the checks had been made out to Joanna F. McKnight and deposited in Prantil's account. The agent's signature had been forged on the check.
4
Prantil was charged with forgery in violation of Section 470 of the California Penal Code. At trial, Prantil argued he knew nothing of the forgery, and that he had deposited the check merely for collection purposes to see whether it was genuine. To establish that Prantil knew the escrow check was forged, the prosecution introduced evidence concerning four trust deeds which Prantil had prepared. Prantil had received information suggesting that the four deeds were forged and that Goins and Bell, were responsible for the forgeries.
5
Prantil was convicted of forgery and sentenced to two years in prison. The California Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. People v. Prantil, 169 Cal. App.3d 592, 215 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1985). The California Supreme Court denied review and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Prantil v. California, 475 U.S. 1067, 106 S.Ct. 1381, 89 L.Ed.2d 606 (1986).1
6
Prantil filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court summarily denied the petition. This court granted Prantil's application for a certificate of probable cause.2
II.
7
Prantil contends that numerous trial court errors and a district court delay in deciding his habeas petition denied him due process.
8
This court reviews de novo a district court's denial of a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254. Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir.1987). This court presumes the state court's findings of fact to be correct. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 (d).
III.
9
Prantil contends he was denied due process because the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish that he passed the forged escrow check "as true and genuine."3
10
This court determines whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
11
The evidence established that Prantil received information prior to the transaction which suggested that Goins and Bell were involved in a forgery scheme. He also knew that one of the possible victims of the scheme was Joanna McKnight, who was described to him as an elderly woman between the ages of 78 and 80. Yet, despite this knowledge, when Prantil deposited the escrow check into his trust account he did not inform the teller that the check might be a forgery or that the woman with him, who appeared to be approximately 40 to 45 years of age, might not be the person whose name appeared on the check. He merely endorsed the check and asked that it be deposited into his account.
12
Prantil's knowledge of the previous forgeries and the contradictory descriptions of McKnight could have led the jury to reasonably conclude that by failing to alert the bank, Prantil was attempting to pass the check "as true and genuine." See People v. Williams, 186 Cal. App.2d 420, 424, 8 Cal. Rptr. 871, 873 (1960) (tender of check purporting to be signed by specific person established "true and genuine" requirement). Thus, the district court did not err in the determining there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find that the "true and genuine" requirement was established beyond a reasonable doubt.
IV.
13
Prantil contends that the trial court deprived him of due process by giving two erroneous jury instructions.
14
This court evaluates jury instructions "in the context of the overall charge to the jury as a component of the entire trial process." Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1239 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 838, 105 S.Ct. 137, 83 L.Ed.2d 77 (1984). To warrant habeas relief, the instruction cannot be merely "undesirable, erroneous, or even 'universally condemned, ' " but must violate some due process right guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146, 94 S.Ct. 396, 400, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973). Moreover, the petitioner in a habeas proceeding has the burden of demonstrating that an erroneous instruction "so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process." Darnell v. Swinney, 823 F.2d 299, 301 (9th Cir.1987), petition for cert. filed, (Oct. 1, 1987).
15
Prantil challenges the trial court's instruction regarding the elements of forgery. He contends that by omitting the "true and genuine" requirement, the trial court denied him his due process right to have the jury consider each element of the charged offense. See Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 87-88, 103 S.Ct. 969, 978, 74 L.Ed.2d 823 (1983) (instruction on presumption of intent reversible error because permitted jury to convict defendant without examining evidence concerning essential element of crime).
16
The trial court gave the following instructions on the elements of forgery:
17
Now, in order to prove the commission of such crime [forgery], each of the following elements must be proved, each of them. Here we go.
18
Number one, that a person passed or offered to pass a forged instrument. That is the first one.
19
Two that such person knew that the instrument was forged; and three, that such person passed or offered to pass such instrument with the specific intent to defraud another person or persons.
20
Although the instruction omitted the "true and genuine" requirement, we consider the instruction in conjunction with the other instructions. See Bashor, 730 F.2d at 1239. Prior to giving the challenged instruction the court told the jury:
21
Now, every person with the specific intent to defraud--now, remember that I told you 'specific intent.' That's it. That's specific intent--with the specific intent to defraud another, utters, publishes, passes or attempts to pass or make use--there's a lot of things here--or make use of, as true and genuine, any false, altered, forged or counterfeited instrument or document, knowing the same to be false, altered, forged or counterfeited, is guilty of the crime of forgery. (emphasis added)
22
Because the overall charge to the jury informed them of the true and genuine requirement, Prantil was not denied his due process right to have the jury consider every element of the crime.
23
Prantil also contends he was denied due process because the trial court gave an inapplicable and erroneous jury instruction on aiding and abetting. Prantil argues that the accomplice instruction removed an issue of intent from the jury's consideration and thus constituted reversible error under the reasoning of Johnson and Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979).
24
However, the prosecutor specifically denied that Prantil could be guilty as an aider and abettor instead of as a principal. An erroneous jury instruction does not merit habeas relief if the deficiencies pertain to matters that are not in dispute and the error did not so affect the entire trial as to deprive the defendant of due process. See Darnell, 823 F.2d at 302-03. The trial court gave proper instructions regarding the intent necessary to convict Prantil as a principal to the forgery. Because the prosecution did not present an accomplice theory, any deficiencies went to a matter that was not in dispute. The error did not mislead the jury on a disputed issue and thus did not so infect the trial as to deprive Prantil of due process. Id.
V.
25
Prantil contends that the trial court denied him due process by refusing to grant judicial use immunity to a potentially exonerating witness.
26
On his motion for a new trial, Prantil claimed that Goins could testify that Goins and Bell had set up Prantil, that Prantil was unaware that the check was stolen, and that Bell had lied to Prantil when he said there were criminal charges pending against him. Goins had been unavailable to testify at the trial because he was in prison on an unrelated charge. At the new trial hearing Goins invoked the privilege against self-incrimination and refused to testify at the trial unless he received judicial use immunity because he was in prison on an unrelated charge. The court denied Prantil's motion to grant immunity to Goins.
27
Under California law, a court may only grant immunity on the prosecutor's request. Cal. Penal Code Sec. 1324. See In re Weber, 11 Cal.3d 703, 720, 523 P.2d 229, 240, 114 Cal. Rptr. 429, 440 (1974). However, the prosecution's failure to request immunity violated Prantil's due process rights if it deprived him of his right to a fair trial. See United States v. Garner, 663 F.2d 834, 839 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905, 102 S.Ct. 1750, 72 L.Ed.2d 161 (1982).
28
Here, Prantil's unsupported assertion is the only indication that Goins would have presented exculpatory testimony had he been granted immunity. The record contains overwhelming evidence that Prantil was not an unwitting accomplice in the crime, much of which would not be controverted by Goins' testimony even if that testimony is as Prantil contends it would be. For example, Prantil knew that the woman who deposited the check in his account did not match the description of the woman whose name appeared on the check. On these facts, we hold that Prantil was not deprived of a fair trial. If Prantil was denied a fair trial in this case, trial courts would be required to grant immunity simply on the basis of unsupported allegations by criminal defendants that immunity is required by due process.
29
Moreover, Prantil has made no showing that any misconduct on the part of the prosecutor caused Goins to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination. See United States v. Lord, 711 F.2d 887, 890-92 (9th Cir.1983).
VI.
30
Prantil contends he was denied due process because of a twenty-month delay between the date of the alleged crime and the date of the indictment.
31
A pre-indictment delay, unlike a delay in bringing a charged defendant to trial, is "tested by general proscriptions of due process."4 Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377, 1381 (9th Cir.1978). A pre-indictment delay does not justify habeas relief unless the defendant can show actual prejudice. Id. at 1382. To prove actual prejudice a defendant must give more than "mere assertions that... witnesses' memories may have faded with the passage of time..." United States v. Horowitz, 756 F.2d 1400, 1405 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822, 106 S.Ct. 74, 88 L.Ed.2d 60 (1985).
32
Prantil contends that he suffered actual prejudice because the bank teller could no longer remember the details of the escrow check transaction. However, the state court of appeals found that the delay did not affect the teller's memory. In addition, the court noted that Prantil was benefited by the teller's unresponsiveness to certain questions; therefore there was no prejudice.
33
Prantil also claims that a seven-month delay between the time he filed his habeas petition and the time the district court dismissed the action violated his right to due process.5
34
In Carter v. Thomas, 527 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir.1976), the Fifth Circuit held that a district court's procedure for handling habeas petitions which routinely resulted in delays of up to twenty months violated due process. However, in Satterlee v. Kritzman, 626 F.2d 682, 683 (9th Cir.1980), we held that a district court's clerical error which resulted in an eight-month delay between the dismissal of a prisoner's habeas petition and the time his files were forwarded to the court of appeals did not deprive the petitioner of any substantive rights. As in Satterlee, here there is no policy of discrimination and no showing that the delay was purposeful.
VII.
35
We conclude that the district court properly dismissed Prantil's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
36
AFFIRMED.
*
The panel finds this case appropriate for submission without oral argument pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 34-4 and Fed. R.App. P. 34 (a)
1
Because Prantil's direct appeal presented the same constitutional claims as his subsequent habeas petition, it is unnecessary for him to have filed for state habeas relief. Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir.1987)
2
Prantil was released from prison on April 20, 1987. However, because a felony conviction may cause a defendant to suffer adverse collateral consequences even after he has served his sentence, a defendant's release from custody prior to the completion of his federal habeas corpus proceedings will not render his petition moot. Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237-38, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 1559, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968). Prantil was in custody when he filed the petition in district court, so this court retains jurisdiction over the proceedings after he is released. Id
3
Under California law, a person is guilty of forgery if he passes or attempts to pass as true and genuine a forged instrument with knowledge of the forgery and with the specific intent to defraud. Cal. Penal Code Sec. 470; People v. Hellman, 189 Cal. App.2d 777, 778-79, 11 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1961). The only element Prantil challenges as lacking sufficient evidence is the true and genuine requirement
4
Once a suspect is indicted, the more stringent requirements of the speedy trial right apply. Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377, 1382 (9th Cir.1978)
5
Prantil first raised the issue in his brief to this court. Ordinarily, this court will not decide an issue which was not raised at the District Court. Bolker v.C.I.R., 760 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir.1985). The court may decide an issue for the first time on appeal, however, where review is necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice or to preserve the integrity of the judicial process. Id. Because a claim that a district court violated a party's due process rights questions the integrity of the federal judicial system, we review Prantil's claim despite his failure to raise it below
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MAIN SITE http://cases.justia.com/us-court-of-appeals/search? q= Prantil &circuit=
http://cases.justia.com/us-court-of-appeals/F2/756/759/162188/ A review of the prosecutor's remarks during the closing argument reveals that his statements, although derogatory and gratuitous by themselves, served to compound the prejudice to the defendant that flowed from Mr. Gorder's ambiguous role as both prosecutor and participant witness. The prosecutor's closing arguments illustrate the degree of actual prejudice that results when an advocate, through his direct participation in the events under litigation, can argue to the jury based on actual or perceived personal knowledge.5 The prosecutor launched a personalized attack on the defendant's motives. A recurrent theme of the prosecutor's summation was to portray the defendant as "greedy, "6 "corrupt, " "dishonest, " and "sleazy." The prosecutor cautioned the jury that the defendant did not meet the minimum standards of attorney behavior demanded by the "advocacy system of justice." As such, the prosecutor explained to the jury that "Mr. Prantil is the kind of person who gives lawyers a bad name to the general public and it's your duty as jurors to call him to account." The prosecutor charged the jury with the responsibility of ridding the ranks of the criminal defense bar of such a "crook" even though "it's true, thank God it's true, that criminal defense attorneys are not crooks as a general rule."
These comments came from an individual who was not only an experienced prosecutor but also, as the jury could not fail to appreciate, both a participant in many of the underlying events and Mr. Prantil's adversary throughout. As previously mentioned, Mr. Gorder had conducted the grand jury examination of the defendant that resulted in three of the defendant's perjury convictions. In his summation of the evidence on these counts, the prosecutor drew the jury's attention to the complete grand jury transcripts. Mr. Gorder informed the jury that these transcripts demonstrated that the defendant committed perjury "not just in the specific counts he's charged with, but in a number of other areas also." Once again, this is an assertion of personal knowledge of a testimonial rather than an argumentative character.
=================================
Initially, we decline to accept the government's contention, raised for the first time on appeal, that the defendant committed perjury by denying knowing who was with Powell in the Omaha area. No question concerning the identity of the person with Mr. Powell in the Omaha area was asked or answered in the grand jury proceedings. Further, the prosecutor's depiction of Mr. Prantil's actual remarks as an attempt to conceal the activities of his sister-in-law from the grand jury is somewhat puzzling in light of the fact that Mr. Gorder had, pursuant to Ms. Schmidt's prior agreement to cooperate with the government, full knowledge of her activities in and around the Omaha area. The only grand jury testimony elicited from the defendant focused on who picked up the defendant at the airport and who drove him back. The defendant said that a woman, whose name he couldn't recall, did so. In our view, this assertion could not have influenced the grand jury's investigation. The defendant's inaccurate testimony about a nonexistent woman at the airport could not have launched any further successful grand jury investigation.
30
The government's entire perjury theory on this count of the indictment depends in equal measure on the false premise that there was a woman at the airport and that this woman was the defendant's sister-in-law, whose identity the defendant wishes to conceal. The defendant, however, could not possibly be testifying falsely so as to shield a nonexistent woman. Similarly, the defendant's inability to recall the name of this nonexistent woman, a testimonial assertion that is hard to peg as a literal falsehood, could not have influenced the grand jury's deliberations. Simply put, if there was no blonde woman at the Omaha airport, the defendant's inability to recall her name is immaterial. Accordingly, because the defendant's testimony was not material, we hold that the defendant's conviction on Count Six is reversed.
31
CONCLUSION
32
To conclude, we reverse defendant's perjury conviction on Count Six of the indictment because the allegedly perjurious statements lack materiality. We reverse and remand the defendant's remaining convictions on the ground that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to recuse the participating prosecutor as a material witness and on the ground of prosecutorial misconduct in the government's closing argument.
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5
In winding up his closing argument, Mr. Gorder clarified his role in the case as follows:
Ladies and Gentlemen, our system of justice is an advocacy system of justice and there are adversaries. In this particular case the United States is an adversary, Frank Prantil is an adversor. I represent the United States and Mr. Iredale represents the defendant. That system depends upon a certain minimum standard of behavior, a system where the attorneys are honest with each other and with the court. Frank Prantil is not that kind of person. He was dishonest from day one until he walked off the stand on October 6th having said that everything was above the board. And it's your duty to call him to account for those actions, and I ask you to return verdicts of guilty on each count of the indictment.
R.T. 116.
6
In his closing argument, Mr. Gorder refers to the defendant's explanation, contained in a tape recording, that the monies he collected represented his attorney's fees in part. In response to the defendant's taped statement that "I have a right to earn my living too, " the prosecutor explains to the jury, "He talks about he's just picking up his fees, again establishing his greed." R.T. 115 (emphasis added)
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Charles F. Gorder, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., argued, Peter K. Nunez, U.S. Atty., Charles F. Gorder, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., on the brief, San Diego, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.
Eugene G. Iredale, San Diego, Cal., for defendant-appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court For the Southern District of California.
Before FERGUSON and NELSON, Circuit Judges, and JAMESON, * District Judge.
FERGUSON, Circuit Judge: http://cases.justia.com/us-court-of-appeals/F2/764/548/149993/
A review of the prosecutor's remarks during the closing argument reveals that his statements, although derogatory and gratuitous by themselves, served to compound the prejudice to the defendant that flowed from Mr. Gorder's ambiguous role as both prosecutor and participant witness. The prosecutor's closing arguments illustrate the degree of actual prejudice that results when an advocate, through his direct participation in the events under litigation, can argue to the jury based on actual or perceived personal knowledge.5 The prosecutor launched a personalized attack on the defendant's motives. A recurrent theme of the prosecutor's summation was to portray the defendant as "greedy, "6 "corrupt, " "dishonest, " and "sleazy." The prosecutor cautioned the jury that the defendant did not meet the minimum standards of attorney behavior demanded by the "advocacy system of justice." As such, the prosecutor explained to the jury that "Mr. Prantil is the kind of person who gives lawyers a bad name to the general public and it's your duty as jurors to call him to account." The prosecutor charged the jury with the responsibility of ridding the ranks of the criminal defense bar of such a "crook" even though "it's true, thank God it's true, that criminal defense attorneys are not crooks as a general rule."
25
These comments came from an individual who was not only an experienced prosecutor but also, as the jury could not fail to appreciate, both a participant in many of the underlying events and Mr. Prantil's adversary throughout. As previously mentioned, Mr. Gorder had conducted the grand jury examination of the defendant that resulted in three of the defendant's perjury convictions. In his summation of the evidence on these counts, the prosecutor drew the jury's attention to the complete grand jury transcripts. Mr. Gorder informed the jury that these transcripts demonstrated that the defendant committed perjury "not just in the specific counts he's charged with, but in a number of other areas also." Once again, this is an assertion of personal knowledge of a testimonial rather than an argumentative character.
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(1984). Hence, we must decide whether the defendant's testimony was material.
29
Initially, we decline to accept the government's contention, raised for the first time on appeal, that the defendant committed perjury by denying knowing who was with Powell in the Omaha area. No question concerning the identity of the person with Mr. Powell in the Omaha area was asked or answered in the grand jury proceedings. Further, the prosecutor's depiction of Mr. Prantil's actual remarks as an attempt to conceal the activities of his sister-in-law from the grand jury is somewhat puzzling in light of the fact that Mr. Gorder had, pursuant to Ms. Schmidt's prior agreement to cooperate with the government, full knowledge of her activities in and around the Omaha area. The only grand jury testimony elicited from the defendant focused on who picked up the defendant at his hotel and who drove him back to the Omaha Airport. The defendant said that a woman, whose name he couldn't recall, did so. In our view, this assertion could not have influenced the grand jury's investigation. The defendant's inaccurate testimony about a nonexistent woman could not have launched any further successful grand jury investigation.
30
The government's entire perjury theory on this count of the indictment depends in equal measure on the false premise that there was a woman who met him at his hotel and that this woman was the defendant's sister-in-law, whose identity the defendant wishes to conceal. The defendant, however, could not possibly be testifying falsely so as to shield a nonexistent woman. Similarly, the defendant's inability to recall the name of this nonexistent woman, a testimonial assertion that is hard to peg as a literal falsehood, could not have influenced the grand jury's deliberations. Simply put, if there was no blonde woman who met the defendant at his hotel and drove him to the airport, the defendant's inability to recall her name is immaterial. Accordingly, because the defendant's testimony was not material, we hold that the defendant's conviction on Count Six is reversed.
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1
http://cases.justia.com/us-court-of-appeals/F2/764/548/149993/ See United States v. Powell, 708 F.2d 455 (9th Cir.1983), rev'd in part, & U.S. &-, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984). Betty Powell was convicted on four counts of a fifteen-count indictment which had alleged that she conspired with her husband and son to distribute cocaine. She was acquitted on all substantive conspiracy counts. Three of her four convictions, those alleging the use of a telephone to facilitate drug offenses, were subsequently reversed on appeal, United States v. Powell, 708 F.2d 455 (9th Cir.1983), but then reinstated by the Supreme Court, United States v. Powell, & U.S. &-, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984)
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 931, 99 S.Ct. 2864, 61 L.Ed.2d 300 (1979)
5
In winding up his closing argument, Mr. Gorder clarified his role in the case as follows:
Ladies and Gentlemen, our system of justice is an advocacy system of justice and there are adversaries. In this particular case the United States is an adversary, Frank Prantil is an adversor. I represent the United States and Mr. Iredale represents the defendant. That system depends upon a certain minimum standard of behavior, a system where the attorneys are honest with each other and with the court. Frank Prantil is not that kind of person. He was dishonest from day one until he walked off the stand on October 6th having said that everything was above the board. And it's your duty to call him to account for those actions, and I ask you to return verdicts of guilty on each count of the indictment.
R.T. 116.
6
In his closing argument, Mr. Gorder refers to the defendant's explanation, contained in a tape recording, that the monies he collected represented his attorney's fees in part. In response to the defendant's taped statement that "I have a right to earn my living too, " the prosecutor explains to the jury, "He talks about he's just picking up his fees, again establishing his greed." R.T. 115 (emphasis added)
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MAIN SITE http://cases.justia.com/us-court-of-appeals/search? q= Prantil &circuit=
http://cases.justia.com/us-court-of-appeals/F2/756/759/162188/ A review of the prosecutor's remarks during the closing argument reveals that his statements, although derogatory and gratuitous by themselves, served to compound the prejudice to the defendant that flowed from Mr. Gorder's ambiguous role as both prosecutor and participant witness. The prosecutor's closing arguments illustrate the degree of actual prejudice that results when an advocate, through his direct participation in the events under litigation, can argue to the jury based on actual or perceived personal knowledge.5 The prosecutor launched a personalized attack on the defendant's motives. A recurrent theme of the prosecutor's summation was to portray the defendant as "greedy, "6 "corrupt, " "dishonest, " and "sleazy." The prosecutor cautioned the jury that the defendant did not meet the minimum standards of attorney behavior demanded by the "advocacy system of justice." As such, the prosecutor explained to the jury that "Mr. Prantil is the kind of person who gives lawyers a bad name to the general public and it's your duty as jurors to call him to account." The prosecutor charged the jury with the responsibility of ridding the ranks of the criminal defense bar of such a "crook" even though "it's true, thank God it's true, that criminal defense attorneys are not crooks as a general rule."
These comments came from an individual who was not only an experienced prosecutor but also, as the jury could not fail to appreciate, both a participant in many of the underlying events and Mr. Prantil's adversary throughout. As previously mentioned, Mr. Gorder had conducted the grand jury examination of the defendant that resulted in three of the defendant's perjury convictions. In his summation of the evidence on these counts, the prosecutor drew the jury's attention to the complete grand jury transcripts. Mr. Gorder informed the jury that these transcripts demonstrated that the defendant committed perjury "not just in the specific counts he's charged with, but in a number of other areas also." Once again, this is an assertion of personal knowledge of a testimonial rather than an argumentative character.
=================================
Initially, we decline to accept the government's contention, raised for the first time on appeal, that the defendant committed perjury by denying knowing who was with Powell in the Omaha area. No question concerning the identity of the person with Mr. Powell in the Omaha area was asked or answered in the grand jury proceedings. Further, the prosecutor's depiction of Mr. Prantil's actual remarks as an attempt to conceal the activities of his sister-in-law from the grand jury is somewhat puzzling in light of the fact that Mr. Gorder had, pursuant to Ms. Schmidt's prior agreement to cooperate with the government, full knowledge of her activities in and around the Omaha area. The only grand jury testimony elicited from the defendant focused on who picked up the defendant at the airport and who drove him back. The defendant said that a woman, whose name he couldn't recall, did so. In our view, this assertion could not have influenced the grand jury's investigation. The defendant's inaccurate testimony about a nonexistent woman at the airport could not have launched any further successful grand jury investigation.
30
The government's entire perjury theory on this count of the indictment depends in equal measure on the false premise that there was a woman at the airport and that this woman was the defendant's sister-in-law, whose identity the defendant wishes to conceal. The defendant, however, could not possibly be testifying falsely so as to shield a nonexistent woman. Similarly, the defendant's inability to recall the name of this nonexistent woman, a testimonial assertion that is hard to peg as a literal falsehood, could not have influenced the grand jury's deliberations. Simply put, if there was no blonde woman at the Omaha airport, the defendant's inability to recall her name is immaterial. Accordingly, because the defendant's testimony was not material, we hold that the defendant's conviction on Count Six is reversed.
31
CONCLUSION
32
To conclude, we reverse defendant's perjury conviction on Count Six of the indictment because the allegedly perjurious statements lack materiality. We reverse and remand the defendant's remaining convictions on the ground that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to recuse the participating prosecutor as a material witness and on the ground of prosecutorial misconduct in the government's closing argument.
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5
In winding up his closing argument, Mr. Gorder clarified his role in the case as follows:
Ladies and Gentlemen, our system of justice is an advocacy system of justice and there are adversaries. In this particular case the United States is an adversary, Frank Prantil is an adversor. I represent the United States and Mr. Iredale represents the defendant. That system depends upon a certain minimum standard of behavior, a system where the attorneys are honest with each other and with the court. Frank Prantil is not that kind of person. He was dishonest from day one until he walked off the stand on October 6th having said that everything was above the board. And it's your duty to call him to account for those actions, and I ask you to return verdicts of guilty on each count of the indictment.
R.T. 116.
6
In his closing argument, Mr. Gorder refers to the defendant's explanation, contained in a tape recording, that the monies he collected represented his attorney's fees in part. In response to the defendant's taped statement that "I have a right to earn my living too, " the prosecutor explains to the jury, "He talks about he's just picking up his fees, again establishing his greed." R.T. 115 (emphasis added)
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Charles F. Gorder, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., argued, Peter K. Nunez, U.S. Atty., Charles F. Gorder, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., on the brief, San Diego, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.
Eugene G. Iredale, San Diego, Cal., for defendant-appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court For the Southern District of California.
Before FERGUSON and NELSON, Circuit Judges, and JAMESON, * District Judge.
FERGUSON, Circuit Judge: http://cases.justia.com/us-court-of-appeals/F2/764/548/149993/
A review of the prosecutor's remarks during the closing argument reveals that his statements, although derogatory and gratuitous by themselves, served to compound the prejudice to the defendant that flowed from Mr. Gorder's ambiguous role as both prosecutor and participant witness. The prosecutor's closing arguments illustrate the degree of actual prejudice that results when an advocate, through his direct participation in the events under litigation, can argue to the jury based on actual or perceived personal knowledge.5 The prosecutor launched a personalized attack on the defendant's motives. A recurrent theme of the prosecutor's summation was to portray the defendant as "greedy, "6 "corrupt, " "dishonest, " and "sleazy." The prosecutor cautioned the jury that the defendant did not meet the minimum standards of attorney behavior demanded by the "advocacy system of justice." As such, the prosecutor explained to the jury that "Mr. Prantil is the kind of person who gives lawyers a bad name to the general public and it's your duty as jurors to call him to account." The prosecutor charged the jury with the responsibility of ridding the ranks of the criminal defense bar of such a "crook" even though "it's true, thank God it's true, that criminal defense attorneys are not crooks as a general rule."
25
These comments came from an individual who was not only an experienced prosecutor but also, as the jury could not fail to appreciate, both a participant in many of the underlying events and Mr. Prantil's adversary throughout. As previously mentioned, Mr. Gorder had conducted the grand jury examination of the defendant that resulted in three of the defendant's perjury convictions. In his summation of the evidence on these counts, the prosecutor drew the jury's attention to the complete grand jury transcripts. Mr. Gorder informed the jury that these transcripts demonstrated that the defendant committed perjury "not just in the specific counts he's charged with, but in a number of other areas also." Once again, this is an assertion of personal knowledge of a testimonial rather than an argumentative character.
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(1984). Hence, we must decide whether the defendant's testimony was material.
29
Initially, we decline to accept the government's contention, raised for the first time on appeal, that the defendant committed perjury by denying knowing who was with Powell in the Omaha area. No question concerning the identity of the person with Mr. Powell in the Omaha area was asked or answered in the grand jury proceedings. Further, the prosecutor's depiction of Mr. Prantil's actual remarks as an attempt to conceal the activities of his sister-in-law from the grand jury is somewhat puzzling in light of the fact that Mr. Gorder had, pursuant to Ms. Schmidt's prior agreement to cooperate with the government, full knowledge of her activities in and around the Omaha area. The only grand jury testimony elicited from the defendant focused on who picked up the defendant at his hotel and who drove him back to the Omaha Airport. The defendant said that a woman, whose name he couldn't recall, did so. In our view, this assertion could not have influenced the grand jury's investigation. The defendant's inaccurate testimony about a nonexistent woman could not have launched any further successful grand jury investigation.
30
The government's entire perjury theory on this count of the indictment depends in equal measure on the false premise that there was a woman who met him at his hotel and that this woman was the defendant's sister-in-law, whose identity the defendant wishes to conceal. The defendant, however, could not possibly be testifying falsely so as to shield a nonexistent woman. Similarly, the defendant's inability to recall the name of this nonexistent woman, a testimonial assertion that is hard to peg as a literal falsehood, could not have influenced the grand jury's deliberations. Simply put, if there was no blonde woman who met the defendant at his hotel and drove him to the airport, the defendant's inability to recall her name is immaterial. Accordingly, because the defendant's testimony was not material, we hold that the defendant's conviction on Count Six is reversed.
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1
http://cases.justia.com/us-court-of-appeals/F2/764/548/149993/ See United States v. Powell, 708 F.2d 455 (9th Cir.1983), rev'd in part, & U.S. &-, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984). Betty Powell was convicted on four counts of a fifteen-count indictment which had alleged that she conspired with her husband and son to distribute cocaine. She was acquitted on all substantive conspiracy counts. Three of her four convictions, those alleging the use of a telephone to facilitate drug offenses, were subsequently reversed on appeal, United States v. Powell, 708 F.2d 455 (9th Cir.1983), but then reinstated by the Supreme Court, United States v. Powell, & U.S. &-, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984)
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 931, 99 S.Ct. 2864, 61 L.Ed.2d 300 (1979)
5
In winding up his closing argument, Mr. Gorder clarified his role in the case as follows:
Ladies and Gentlemen, our system of justice is an advocacy system of justice and there are adversaries. In this particular case the United States is an adversary, Frank Prantil is an adversor. I represent the United States and Mr. Iredale represents the defendant. That system depends upon a certain minimum standard of behavior, a system where the attorneys are honest with each other and with the court. Frank Prantil is not that kind of person. He was dishonest from day one until he walked off the stand on October 6th having said that everything was above the board. And it's your duty to call him to account for those actions, and I ask you to return verdicts of guilty on each count of the indictment.
R.T. 116.
6
In his closing argument, Mr. Gorder refers to the defendant's explanation, contained in a tape recording, that the monies he collected represented his attorney's fees in part. In response to the defendant's taped statement that "I have a right to earn my living too, " the prosecutor explains to the jury, "He talks about he's just picking up his fees, again establishing his greed." R.T.
Mary Prantil's Book & Case # from NYC Department Of Corrections - Prantil Mary IS AVerified Criminal Convicted for Deception, FRAUD, Grand LARCENY, EXTORTION, ABUSE, HARRASSMENT OF INNOCENT BUSINESS OWNERS
HERE FIND MARY PRANTIL'S CRIMINAL BOOK AND CASE NUMBER LOOK UP ANYONE CAN PULL IT UP BY FOLLOWING THESE SIMPLE INSTRUCTIONS:
The public may look up Mary Prantil's criminal records, on the NYC Department Of Corrections web site so you the public can see what a real piece of crap Mary Prantil really is.
Go to the following link which is the NYC jail inmate lookup:
http://a072-web.nyc.gov/inmatelookup/
After the page has been pulled up, you will see the place where to enter Mary Prantil's Booking and Case Number, which is 3471001054- simply enter that number in the white box, as shown below.
As you will see, the NYC Department Of Corrections has all her criminal information and charges posted. As we have said numerous times in the past, we have proof of what we have been warning the public about this criminal Mary Prantil all along, so see for yourself- go to the link, enter her book and case number, the information is current and is all there for anyone because it is PUBLIC RECORD. The facts, simply put.
Enter
NYSID or Book & Case Number: (enter 3471001054)
You will then find, on the NYC Department of Corrections Inmate Lookup, Mary Prantil's criminal records, including her Felony Stalking charge.
May Mary Prantil rot in Hell, if the Devil will even let her in, LOL. Good riddance, freak Prantil :(LOL the joke is on U
LOOK PRANTIL TAX EVASION CHARGES AND REPORTS AGAINST YOU TAX WARRANTS REPORTED TO THE NEW YORK STATE AND FEDERAL TAX BOARDS YOU SHOULD LEARN YOUR LESSON AND LET INNOCENT PEOPLE ALONE AND MIND YOUR OWN DAMN BUSINESS!!!
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Office of Tax Enforcement - File an Information Referral to report suspected tax evasion and fraud
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Information Referral:
This information referral concerns a (n)* Individual Business/Tax Preparer/Practioner
Description of Information Referral*
Please include a detailed description of the alleged violation activity.
https://www.integrascan.com/search_results.php? type
County in which warrant is filed of Taxpayer Searched:
MARY PRANTIL QUEENS
Warrant ID# : E-029211902-W001-3
Name of Taxpayer as appears on warrant
Address of Taxpayer as appears on warrant
MARY PRANTIL 32-85 33 ST C2
ASTORIA, NY 11106
Date Warrant docketed by county clerk County where Warrant is docketed Tax Liability amount as appears on Warrant Date notice of tax warrant, amendment, vacation or satisfaction was filed by the Department of Taxation and Finance with the Department of State.
Date Warrant satisfaction docketed by county clerk Date Warrant Vacate Notice docketed by county clerk Date Warrant amendment docketed by county clerk
June 10 QUEENS $106.21 June 20
Warrant ID# : E-029159448-W001-7
Name of Taxpayer as appears on warrant
Address of Taxpayer as appears on warrant
MARY PRANTIL 32-85 33 ST C2
ASTORIA, NY 11106
Date Warrant docketed by county clerk County where Warrant is docketed Tax Liability amount as appears on Warrant Date notice of tax warrant, amendment, vacation or satisfaction was filed by the Department of Taxation and Finance with the Department of State. Date Warrant satisfaction docketed by county clerk Date Warrant Vacate Notice docketed by county clerk Date Warrant amendment docketed by county clerk
February 14 QUEENS $4, 072.14 February 14
* Filed with Department of State on or prior to implementation of electronic filing system, January 8. Dates for filings made prior to January 8 must be derived from paper filings and should be obtained from the Department of Taxation and Finance.
Taxpayer Name (s) Selected: City specified in warrant address record of Taxpayer Searched: County in which warrant is filed of Taxpayer Searched: MARY PRANTIL, QUEENS
Subject Information:
Please enter as much information as you can regarding the primary person allegedly involved in the complaint.
First Name* Mary T.
Last Name* Prantil
Street Address 32-85 33rd Street
Apt # C-2
City* Astoria
State* New York, 11106
Cell Phone Number: 9172246605
Also Known As: Mary Prantil, Mary T. Prantil, Mary Theresa Prantil
Date of Birth January 27, 1965
Physical Description: Female, white, eyes green, hair blonde, 95 pounds
Any known partners, affiliates, etc.:
WE EMAILED IT, AND MAILED A FED EX HARD COPY TOO, SO PRANTIL YOU NEED TO STOP POSTING LIES ABOUT US AND LEAVE US ALONE ONCE AND FOR ALL BECAUSE YOU HAVE LOST THIS BATTLE SO GET OVER YOURSELF!!! EVERYONE KNOWS ALL ABOUT YOU, WHO YOU ARE AND WHAT YOU HAVE DONE.
If you would prefer to mail this form, print it and mail it to:
NYS Department of Taxation and Finance
Report Suspected Tax Evasion/Fraud
Information Referral Unit
Income/Franchise Desk Audit
Albany NY 12227-0166
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